British National Gillian Gibbons, who teaches children in Sudan, has been arrested and charged with offending religion.

She had been held without charges for several days. Today, Sudanese officials filed formal charges. She faces a potential sentence, if convicted, of 40 lashes, a year in prison, or a hefty fine.

She came under suspicion after the children in her class voted to name the classroom’s new stuffed bear mascot “Mohammed.” Naming a stuffed bear “Mohammed” is appar­ently offensive to Islam, and Sudan has laws against offending a religion.

Allegedly, Sudan’s anti-​​blasphemy law is religion-​​neutral. The classroom contained both Muslim and non-​​Muslim students. Sudan is 70% Muslim (Sunni).

The relevant statute is Chapter 21, Section 242:

Insulting or Exciting Contempt of Religious Creed: Whoever by any means publicly insults or seeks to excite contempt of any religion in such a manner as to be likely to lead to a breach of the peace, commits an offence and shall on conviction, be punished with impris­onment for a term not exceeding three years or with fine or with both.

[Aside: I looked through the whole penal code, and I couldn’t figure out how Ms. Gibbons could poten­tially be subject to whipping as a sentence. The statute above does not provide for whipping as a punishment, and the statutes only allow the impo­sition of whipping in lieu of impris­onment by certain judges trying cases summarily against male defen­dants. And in such a situation, such lashings are limited to 10 strokes. I cannot find any provision in the materials available to me (there may be others outside my purview that allow it) that would allow the impo­sition of a sentence of 40 lashes on Ms. Gibbons. I assume it’s a discre­tionary substitute, but for the life of me I cannot turn up any statutory text. That might be by design, of course.]

There is no question whether any government has the moral authority to enact or enforce anti-​​blasphemy laws. No government legit­i­mately holds that authority. The freedom to criticize an idea is an essential component of the liberty required for a rational mind to function. Any government that outlaws blasphemy cripples the minds of those subject to its juris­diction and is therefore morally repugnant. So I’m really not inter­ested in whether what she did (naming the bear after one of her students, pursuant to a classroom vote) counts as blasphemy or offense to Islam, or whether she is guilty of the unjust statute.

What interests me is the authority of the British government to intercede. They have no legal authority under Sudanese law, of course. Such a thing would be contrary to Sudan’s notion of its own sover­eignty. Instead, I think the British government has an oblig­ation to step in and prevent Ms. Gibbons’ pros­e­cution, in exactly the same way and for exactly the same reasons that Sudan has an oblig­ation not to pass repugnant laws: Because the purpose of government — any government — is to preserve and defend indi­vidual rights. The alleged sover­eignty of an oppressive government to enact laws obnoxious to indi­vidual rights notwithstanding.

Of course, Britain will likely not be willing to use whatever force is necessary to protect Ms. Gibbons. The US was not willing to do so back in 1994 in the case of Michael Fay. (Granted, that was on a charge of vandalism, not blasphemy, but the principle can be applied in the context of excessive or extreme punishment, not just the context of an improper law.) In Ms. Gibbons’ case, the British government is morally obligated to protect her from any pros­e­cution, regardless of the particular sentence imposed.

To those who would say that Ms. Gibbons assumed the risk of pros­e­cution under an unjust law by traveling to and living in a country that does not respect indi­vidual rights, I say nonsense. Rights exist. It is government’s job to preserve and defend them.

I see a parallel to the 1951 nation­al­ization by Iran of British oil interests in that country. In that case, the property rights of British nationals were violated by the capri­cious and unjust action of the Iranian government. Not only would Britain have been justified in using force to defend those property interests, they were morally obligated to do so, and failed. In that case, the persons whose rights were violated were British nationals presently in Britain, whereas Ms. Gibbons is a British national presently abroad. If there is any difference between the two situ­a­tions, this is it.

Nationality, by which I mean citi­zenship, appears to become relevant in the analysis of government power, but in fact it does not. Any just government, dedicated to preserving and defending indi­vidual rights, has the moral authority to protect those rights of any person anywhere in the world, citizen or not. It is only the duty to do so that arises by virtue of citizenship.

Or do I have it wrong? Does a just government owe a duty to every person in the world? If I have it right, what is citi­zenship? Does it grant addi­tional rights beyond those enjoyed by every indi­vidual? Is that a good idea?