Maine legalizes same-sex marriage

By legislative action, no less. Without a court telling them they had to do it. That makes Maine the second state to enact same-sex marriage without a judicial order to do so, and the first state to enact same-sex marriage without a judicial order to at least create a parallel licensing system (as the Vermont Supreme Court did back before that state created its civil union system). Also, the first state to legislatively dispose of a prior legislative ban (Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 19-A § 701 (2009)).

My last law school exam ever starts in 10 minutes. Woo hoo!

Here is a hopefully useful excerpt from a footnote in my Law Review article. It’s not the whole footnote, and I’m not going to share the entire article for at least some time, as I have other plans for it. But this one footnote, the result of many, many hours of research, could be useful to others and I thought I would share it.

(For those who are interested, the article is not really about same-sex marriage as such, but about an obscure little choice of law problem in one of the very few areas where federal courts have to look into the validity of a marriage - the common law spousal privileges under Fed. R. Evid. 501.)

112. 37 states have enacted statutes banning same-sex marriage and prohibiting the recognition of out-of-state same-sex marriages. Ala. Code § 30-1-19 (2009) (Alabama); Alaska Stat. § 25.05.013 (2009) (Alaska); Ariz. Rev. Stat. §§ 25-101, 25-112 (2009) (Arizona); Ark. Code Ann. §§ 9-11-107, 9-11-109, 9-11-208(b)-(c) (2009) (Arkansas); Colo. Rev. Stat. § 14-2-104 (2009) (Colorado); Del. Code Ann. tit. 13, § 101(a), (d) (2009) (Delaware); Fla. Stat. § 741.212 (2009) (Florida); Ga. Code Ann. § 19-3-3.1 (2009) (Georgia); Haw. Rev. Stat. § 572 (2009) (Hawai’i); Idaho Code Ann. §32-209 (2009) (Idaho); 750 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/201, 5/212, 5/213.1 (2009) (Illinois); Ind. Code § 31-11-1-1 (2009) (Indiana); Kan. Stat. Ann. §§ 23-101, 23-115 (2009) (Kansas); Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 402.005, 402.020, 402.040, 402.045 (2009) (Kentucky); La. Civ. Code Ann. art. 89, 96, 3520 (2009) (Louisiana); Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 19-A § 701 (2009) (Maine); Md. Code Ann., Fam. Law § 2-201 (2009) (Maryland); Mich. Comp. Laws §§ 551.1, 551.271 (2009) (Michigan); Minn. Stat. §§ 517.03, 518.01 (2009) (Minnesota); Miss. Code Ann. §93-1-1 (2009) (Mississippi); Mo. Rev. Stat. § 451.022 (2009) (Missouri); Mont. Code Ann. §§ 40-1-103, 40-1-401 (2009) (Montana); N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 51-1, 51-1.2 (2009) (North Carolina); N.D. Cent. Code §§ 14-03-01; 14-13-08 (2009) (North Dakota); Ohio Rev. Code § 3101.01 (Ohio); Okla. Stat. tit. 43 § 43-3.1 (2009) (Oklahoma); Pa. Cons. Stat. § 1704 (2009) (Pennsylvania); S.C. Code Ann. §§ 20-1-10, 20-1-15 (2009) (South Carolina); S.D. Codified Laws §§ 25-1-1, 25-1-38 (2009) (South Dakota); Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-3-113 (2009) (Tennessee); Tex. Fam. Code §§ 2.001, 6.204 (2009) (Texas); Utah Code Ann. §§ 30-1-2, 30-1-4.1 (2009) (Utah); Va. Code §§ 20-45.2, 20-45.3 (2009) (Virginia); Wash. Rev. Code §§ 26.04.010, 26.04.020 (2009) (Washington); W. Va. Code § 48-2-603 (2009) (West Virginia); Wis. Stat. §§ 765.001, 765.01, 765.04 (2009) (Wisconsin); Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 20-1-101 (2009) (Wyoming). One state, New Hampshire, has enacted statutes banning same sex marriage, but allowing for limited domestic recognition of out-of-state same-sex marriages, provided that the couple establish domicile in the state after marrying and that the marriage was not effected in a manner designed to circumvent the state’s prohibition of such marriages. N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 457:1-3, 457:43 (2009). Research produced no word from Vermont’s legislature or courts on whether out-of-state same-sex marriages would be recognized as civil unions under Vermont’s civil union framework under Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 15, ch.23 (2009). However, given that Vermont’s civil union framework has now been supplanted by allowing same-sex marriage in the state, . . . such recognition will likely be unnecessary in the future. Vermont is likely to recognize out-of-state same sex marriages as valid, as are the other three states which now allow same-sex marriage, although this has not yet been tested in court. . . . Vermont formerly had a statutory ban on same-sex marriage, Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 15, §§ 5, 8 (2008), but has since repealed it, becoming the first state to legislatively enact same-sex marriage without a court order to do so. . .&nbsp. As of this writing, only two state statutes banning same-sex marriage have been struck down by courts. Conn. Gen. Stat. §46b-38aa (2008) (providing for same-sex civil unions but defining marriage as “the union of one man and one woman”), invalidated by Kerrigan v. Comm’r of Pub. Health, 49 Conn. Sup. 664 (2008) (holding that the statute’s definition of marriage violated state constitution’s guarantee of equal protection); Iowa Code § 595.2 (2009) (Iowa) (stating that “[o]nly a marriage between a male and a female is valid”), invalidated by Varnum v. Brien, No. CV5965, 2007 WL 2468667 (Iowa Dist. 2007) (unconstitutional on equal protection grounds), aff’d Varnum v. Brien, No. 07-1499, slip op. at 69 (Iowa 2009). 29 states have written same-sex marriage bans into their state constitutions. Ala. Const. amend. 774 (Alabama); Alaska Const. art. I, § 25 (Alaska); Ariz. Const. art. XXX (Arizona); Ark. Const. amend. 83 (Arkansas); Cal. Const. art. I, § 7.5 (California); Colo. Const. art. II, § 31 (Colorado); Fla. Const. art. I, § 27 (Florida); Ga. Const. art. I § IV (Georgia); Haw. Const. art. 1, § 23 (Hawai’i); Idaho Const. art. III, § 28 (Idaho); Kan. Const. art. 15, § 16 (Kansas); Ky. Const. § 233A (Kentucky); La. Const. art. XII, § 15 (Louisiana); Mich. Const. art. I, § 25 (Michigan); Miss. Const. art. 14, § 263A (Mississippi); Mo. Const. art. I, § 33 (Missouri); Mont. Const. art. XIII, § 7 (Montana); Neb. Const. art. I, § 29 (Nebraska); Nev. Const. art. I, § 21 (Nevada); N.D. Const. art. XI, § 28 (North Dakota); Ohio Const. art. XV, § 11 (Ohio); Okla. Const. art. 2, § 35 (Oklahoma); Or. Const. art. XV, § 5a (Oregon); S.C. Const. art. XVII, § 15 (South Carolina); S.D. Const. art. XXI, § 9 (South Dakota); Tenn. Const. art. XI, § 18 (Tennessee); Tex. Const. art 1, § 32 (Texas); Utah Const. art 1, §29 (Utah); Va. Const. art. I, § 15-A (Virginia); Wis. Const. art. XIII, § 13 (Wisconsin). Only Massachusetts, Vermont, Connecticut and Iowa currently allow same-sex marriages. . . . The four remaining states (New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, and Rhode Island) and the District of Columbia have no ban. See National Conference of State Legislatures, Same Sex Marriage, http://www.ncsl.org/programs/cyf/samesex.htm (last visited March 27, 2009). . . .

“Who’s there?”

“Orange.”

“Orange who?”

“Orange you glad you didn’t vote for McCain!”

I still say Stevens is due - he’ll be 89 this year. And Ginsburg has health issues. Luckily all three are part of the liberal bloc and will be replaced with liberals - not likely to upset court balance.

I’m in the middle of finals week in my last semester in law school. Assuming I pass everything, I’ll graduate on May 17th, which is incidentally the septenvigintennial of my birth.

Complaint here. [pdf]

Various plaintiffs married to or formerly married to and now widowed by persons of the same sex under Massachusetts law after Goodridge filed suit in the United States District Court for District of Massachusetts yesterday (case no. 1:2009cv10309) directly challenging the constitutionality of § 3 of the Federal Defense of Marriage Act, Pub L. No. 105-199, 110 Stat. 2419 (1996) (codified at 1 U.S.C. § 7) under implied equal protection afforded by the 5th Amendment’s Due Process Clause.

(For those who aren’t aware, the “Equal Protection Clause” under which equal protection challenges are most often raised is part of the 14th Amendment and applies only to the States, not the federal government. However, the 5th Amendment’s Due Process clause is interpreted to include an equal protection provision similar, but not identical to, the one in the 14th Amendment. Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497. The instant case is an equal protection challenge to DOMA under this doctrine.)

The plaintiffs were denied federal benefits by various federal agencies on the ground that DOMA prohibited federal recognition of their marriages. The relevant portion of the Act reads:

In determining the meaning of any Act of Congress, or of any ruling, regulation, or interpretation of the various administrative bureaus and agencies of the United States, the word ‘marriage’ means only a legal union between one man and one woman as husband and wife, and the word ‘spouse’ refers only to a person of the opposite sex who is a husband or wife.

Two plaintiffs are government employees who have been denied health benefits for their spouses under the health insurance programs offered by the government as their employer. Their spouses are named as plaintiffs but have questionable standing. Both primary plaintiffs are employed by government agencies that should not exist: the United States Postal Service and the Social Security Administration. A fifth plaintiff is the surviving widower of a former government employee who has been denied survivor’s benefits. This plaintiff’s decedent was a member of Congress.

Four plaintiffs have sought to file income tax returns as “married filing jointly”, and have incurred greater tax liability by filing as “single” or “head of household” than they would have incurred had they been able to file as “married filing jointly.”

Three plaintiffs are widowers who have been denied lump-sum Social Security death benefits. This is a clearly improper welfare-state benefit. Another plaintiff seeks to increase her social security benefits on the basis of her spouse’s higher lifetime earning during their relationship. Her spouse is named as a plaintiff, with dubious standing. This plaintiff seeks this increase based on the entire relationship, not merely during the time of the marriage. This particular claim raises extremely negative PR implications, see below.

One plaintiff sought and was denied a renewed passport in his married name. Under the law of all states (including Massachusetts), either spouse may effect an immediate, legal change of name by executing a marriage license in the chosen married name. This plaintiff chose to take his spouse’s last name, and was denied a passport bearing that name when he offered his marriage license as proof of the legal name change. His spouse is named as a plaintiff, and I can think of no viable argument by which the spouse can claim standing.

All of these claims (except the last one) are exactly why Congress passed the DOMA - to prevent gay couples from drawing on the federal purse.

Some of the benefits demanded by the plaintiffs are benefits that result from a relationship with the federal government as employees, albeit as employees of improper agencies. But in general there isn’t anything wrong with the government employing people and compensating them. Ancillary question: can the government as employer offer health insurance as compensation, and if so, in what form? If the government can offer to pay for health insurance for its employees, can it legitimately place any non-performance-based restrictions on it?

The social security claims are a PR nightmare, because they represent exactly what proponents of DOMA feared when the Act was rammed through Congress in 1996. (I’ve read most of the Congressional Record concerning the Act for an article I am writing. I won’t cite to it here, because, trust me, you don’t want to read it.) Additionally, one of these claims seeks SSA recognition of a lesbian relationship prior to marriage, and even prior to the legalization of marriage in Massachusetts. The wrong kind of gay marriage opponent will latch onto this feature to whip up rhetoric in favor of further complicating legislation.

Of all the claims, the passport one is, in my view, the best. It is also fairly weak. For one thing, the plaintiff could simply go to a Massachusetts court and request an additional order of change of name, separate from the marriage license, and offer that order to the State Department (yes, that is why Hillary Clinton is named as a defendant - she’s the Sec’y of State now) as proof of change of name.

All of the claims suffer from a major defect. They claim violation of the 5th Amendment’s silent equal protection clause on the grounds that plaintiffs have been treated differently from similarly situated opposite-sex couples. But plaintiffs are not similarly situated with opposite-sex couples. They are married in a form of marriage that is distinctly different than opposite-sex marriage, not just at law, but in fact. Same-sex relationships are different from opposite-sex relationships, married or not. The complaint relies exclusively on this “similarly situated” argument, and does not make any argument that Congress’ different treatment of something which is, in fact, different is in violation of equal protection. The complaint alleges that the disparate treatment is made “without justification in excess of Congressional authority,” but the burden of proof in this case will be on plaintiffs to show that Congress’ exercise of its authority to treat different things differently had no rational basis. (Gay marriage is not a fundamental right, affording strict scrutiny. Being gay is not a suspect classification affording strict scrutiny, although some have argued that Lawrence v. Texas suggests that it might be something special, subjecting statutes discriminating on that basis to intermediate scrutiny, like statutes discriminating on the basis of gender.)

In sum, this is not the best set of claims on which to challenge § 3 of DOMA.

More on this later. Maybe. If I’m not too busy.

Things are … happening.

Bad things.

September 11

I thought about blogging on September 11, but I couldn’t think of anything new to say. That’s sad. Seven years, and nothing has gotten better. Nothing tall and shining has risen from Lower Manhattan except the same phantom lights that are dragged out every year to stand in for real honor. Politicians putting on a show, so they look like they’re doing something meaningful. The day has become a joke. An opportunity for public displays of affected grief, vapid speeches about “never forget[ting]”, and other political grandstanding. What the politicians and the bureaucrats and the local civic event planners and university presidents don’t understand is that the only meaningful memorial is to do something about it. Destroy the enemy. Rebuild what was destroyed. Better. Stronger. Taller. Rekindle the flame of the West.

Election Politics

Veep picks came out. And they were perfectly in line with my analysis of this election. Palin is more zealously religious than McCain, and Biden is a bigger socialist than Obama. It follows the pattern. Main ticket appeals to the center while appeasing the power base with with the No. 2 slot. Everything falls into place as expected. The choice of Palin, especially, confirms that the Republicans are the party with the support of the religious right. A Republican win this year will be a major win for Jesus. We will not recover easily.

Court Watching

One of the dangers of a McCain presidency sits, aged and waiting to retire, on the Supreme Court. Justice Stevens is 88 years old. A very staunch liberal, Stevens also supports O’Connor’s “no endorsement” test for deciding Establishment Clause cases.

That is, when someone challenges some government action (say, putting a statue of the Ten Commandments in a state courthouse lobby) on the ground that it violates the Establishment Clause (”Congress shall make no law . .&nbsp. respecting an establishment of religion . . . .”), the Court will look to see whether the action appears to endorse religion in a way that makes non-religious people (or adherents of other religions) feel like political outsiders, and, if it does, will strike the action as unconstitutional. Sure it is not a perfect test, but it is the most secular approach to church-state separation currently in good legal standing. (The Lemon Test, which isn’t really from Lemon v. Kurtzman, is narrower than O’Connor’s test, and is on shakier footing, having been several times rejected and resurrected by the Court.)

Some on the Court hate this test, and would allow the government, especially state governments, to express their own religious views. Thomas and Scalia chief among them. Both have expressly stated that they would take the opportunity, should it be presented to the Court, to disincorporate the Establishment Clause. See, the Establishment Clause, like most of the other provisions of the Bill of Rights, apply to the states only by virtue of the 14th Amendment’s command that “No state shall . . . deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.” The protections of the Bill of Rights have, one by one, mostly been “incorporated” into the concept of due process, thereby being made applicable to state governments through this part of the 14th Amendment. (On exception is the 7th Amendment’s guarantee of a jury in civil cases at common law where the amount in controversy exceeds $20. This guarantee has not been incorporated into due process, and is not enforceable against the states.)

So when Scalia and Thomas talk about disincorporating the Establishment Clause, they mean to take it out of the concept of “due process”, and stop enforcing the clause against the states. This is in line with their jurisprudential approach, a form of Originalism called “original meaning.” They argue that the original meaning of the Establishment Clause was that the Federal government should have no power to disestablish the state churches that were established at the time of the adoption of the Constitution. If the Supreme Court disincorporated the Establishment Clause, the states would be free not only to endorse religion (in the general or in the particular), but would be free to fund religion directly creating de facto, or even explicitly de jure official state churches.

What does this have to do with Justice Stevens and the election? Well, there are a few more steps we have to go through, so keep reading.

Justice Alito is relatively new to the Court, so he has not had the opportunity to express his views on disincorporation. During his tenure as a Circuit Court Judge, however, he has been a consistent enemy of the separation of church and state, supporting state action that would fail both the Lemon test and O’Connor’s “no endorsement” test. Chief Justice Roberts also has said nothing about disincorporation, but he also has a not-so-secular track record on Establishment Clause issues. Even if Alito and Roberts are not in favor of total disincorporation, both are demonstrably in support of a major shift in Establishment Clause jurisprudence away from O’Connor’s “no endorsement” test to a far less toothy “no coercion” test, which would only prohibit state action that forces people to participate in religious activities. This is a position that would easily gain Scalia’s and Thomas’ votes.

The remaining Justices, with the sometime exception of Justice Breyer, who was responsible for the flip-flop in the Van Orden v. Perry-slash-McCreary County v. ACLU of Kentucky fiasco back in 2005, are pro-”no endorsement”.

Five on the good side, four on the bad.

And Justice Stevens, who is on the good side (of this issue) is 88 years old.

I suspect that Justice Stevens is holding on out of hope that a Democrat will be elected in November. Stevens is no fan of the Bush Administration, and I’m sure he’d be damned rather than allow Bush to name his replacement. If he waits to retire until after January 20th, he’s got a (roughly) 50/50 chance that a Democrat will be in office.

The relation to McCain is this: McCain has the backing of the religious right. He will nominate someone who will play to their interests on key issues like abortion. Someone who is religious and excuses it under the rallying cry “States’ Rights”. He won’t get anyone else past the Republican Senate, and he won’t want to. If McCain nominates Stevens’ replacement, the vote-counting scale will tip the other way. The bad way.

The odds are better than even that, if McCain wins in November, we will see a de facto state-sponsored church within 6 years. Definitely in a Southern state. Probably in South Carolina.

The Year of the Veeps

Speaking of Vice Presidential picks, my mother has a theory that neither McCain nor Obama will last a full term in office. She thinks McCain will leave office over health problems and Obama will be assassinated. Unfortunately, she didn’t offer too many facts in support of this theory, but I do get the impression that a Veep Ascendancy is perhaps slightly more likely sometime in the next four years than it has been in recent decades. But perhaps it is just the Doom of the Now talking.

What Man Hath Wrought

Congress dug the grave for today’s rapidly collapsing economy during the Great Depression when it formalized our transition from a rights-based government to an entitlements-based one. But the nail in the coffin came in 1977, with the passage of the Community Reinvestment Act, 12 U.S.C. § 2901 et seq.. The Act requires banks to give mortgages to people who cannot afford them, for houses in declining markets, and on similar terms with mortgages to financially stable folks in good areas. The Act requires banks to make very risky loans, and then audits the banks to make sure they’re in quota compliance. Affirmative action for high-credit-risk people. So to stay in business, banks had to make lots and lots of risky, often worthless loans, but doing so took lots of money that the banks had to find some way to recoup. So they did what they could with what they had. They sold on the high-risk mortgages to big financial houses, who aggregated them and split them up into tradeable securities.

Why? To even out the risk and minimize the impact of individual defaults on these high-risk mortgages. Here’s how it works when things are normal: You have 1000 mortgages. Some are high-risk, and some are sure to pay off. But sometimes it is hard to tell which is which, so you can’t really get a good price for the good ones. So you dump them all in a pot and divy them up again into a new product: the Mortgaged-Backed Security. You make (for the sake of ease) 1000 of these out of your big pot. These are securities someone else can buy. Each one grants a right to enforce each of the mortgages, but only for 1/1000 of their value. In this way, the high risk mortgages are moderated by the low-risk ones. The risk of default is spread out. You can get an even price across the pot. You get a consistent product. And fluctuations in the housing market, or the wider economy, are buffered.

But when everything in your pot is shit, you don’t get an evenly-mediocre but generally safe product. You get shit. So you sell it at a bargain basement price. But this shit, which is backed by mortgages that are a hair’s breadth away from worthless, is extra-sensitive to wider housing and economic pressures. Because these are mortgages owed by people who can barely afford to make payments. When the economy slows, even slightly, for any reason, great galloping scads of people will miss payments, will fail on their mortgages, and will render these securities you’ve been selling totally worthless.

Mortgaged-Backed Securities are the market’s way of trying to cope with the steaming pile of shit handed to it by the Community Reinvestment Act. But the problem with shit is you can only spread it around. You can’t make it smell nice. See, the banks would have closed if they couldn’t sell the risky mortgages on. And whoever they sold them to would have stopped buying if they couldn’t minimize the risk and sell them on again at a marginal advantage. But the shit kept coming in, in the form of more and more high-risk “subprime” mortgages required by the Community Reinvestment Act. Until everyone is up to their earballs in shit.

The banks are involved: you get bank failure after bank failure. The pseudo-State-sponsored mortgage lenders are involved: you get Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. The brokerages and securities houses are involved: you get Bear Stearns and Lehman Brothers and Merrill Lynch.

But where do these Mortgage-Backed Securities end up? They are traded back and forth on the markets. They sit in mutual funds and retirement funds and pension plans and individuals’ portfolios. And when the economy turns and they become worthless in a heartbeat, all of these crash. The result is today’s stock market crash.

The market managed these mortgages in the best way it could, but it couldn’t eliminate the underlying problem. The market could only buffer and postpone the disaster created by Congress in 1977. But the market will take the blame for today.

Things look very, very bleak. Underpinning all this bleakness is the slow death of Western culture.

Next week, I will make a post covering the more optimistic side of things, and what will be needed to save the West.